Conference on "International Security Challenges and Strategies in the New Era"
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New Security Challenges for a New Century
Keynote Address by Ambassador Linton Brooks

Thank you for having me here today. I know how much work goes into putting on a conference of this scope, and I congratulate the organizers for all their efforts. I know that they will pay off.

This is an important conference, put on by an important institution. As the acting Administrator of NNSA, I work closely with Sandia on any number of technical projects – and I can assure you that like all the NNSA labs, the output is terrific and greatly supports our efforts in Washington to advance the national security agenda. Putting on this conference is just as important. We cannot allow our commitment to technology, research and development, and hardware to overshadow the importance of robust understanding of the difficult national security issues that drive our agenda. So I commend Sandia for what I can see already is a first rate effort.

The first thing I noticed when I looked over the agenda for this Conference was that this isn't my father's Sandia Arms Control Conference. That Conference had become an institution in its own right – and comfortably reliable. It dealt in depth with any number of pressing arms control issues, providing a first class forum for discussion that was always timely, intelligent, and cutting edge. But arms control is largely the agenda of the past.

It's clear that a conscious effort was made to reorient the focus of this Conference. Even the title – "International Security Challenges in the New Era" – is notable –the focus of the Conference has shifted from narrower questions

pertaining to arms control, to a much broader examination of critical national security issues. That's significant, and a useful reflection of the times in which we're living.

So I'd like to give you some perspective on how the Administration is dealing with today's myriad challenges, because I think such a discussion can be a useful point of departure for the deliberations that lay before you over the next couple days.

I want to start with a little context. Why was Sandia right to broaden the scope of this conference? Because arms control was a hallmark of the Cold War and the Cold War is over. It was succeeded by that odd era we were never able to name. We could only name it by saying what it was not, so we called it the post-Cold War period. But that period too is over. It ended on September 11, 2001. The events of that day were galvanizing for the American people and the world. I think the significance of that day is that it brought a collective recognition that a long-emerging threat had come to fruition, and was now starkly visible and at the forefront of our national collective consciousness.

If the events of September 11 did not exactly signal a new threat, they signaled the evolution of a threat that would require a national effort of unprecedented scale to address. For years, there had been growing concern that terrorists or rogue states would find the ability to bring the threat directly to our shores. Now it had happened. Indeed, on that day we left the post-Cold War period and entered the age of terrorism. For the foreseeable future the fight against terrorism and the states that sponsor it will be the key organizing principle of international relations.

In his September, 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, President Bush had it exactly right. He simply pointed out that "Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to

endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank."

I once had some modest credentials as a military strategist. I thought in terms of power projection, of re-supply of oversees forces, of deterrence. But always of something that happened "over there." When I thought of the home front it was as an arsenal, invulnerable to attack except by Soviet nuclear weapons, which would be held at bay by a robust deterrent. Now, such concepts are no longer useful. Distinctions between national security and homeland security have become blurred – both must be dealt with together, for they have become one and the same. There is no greater symbol of this than the Administration's establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, the rapidity with which the Department was established, or even its sheer size.

These changes are significant. But dwarfing them is another change: what if the terrorists have weapons of mass destruction and are not amenable to traditional notions of deterrence? Dealing with this possibility has been a major focus of Administration efforts since that horrible day 19 months ago.

The clearest articulation of the Administration's approach is set forth in two critical documents: the September, 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States; and the December, 2002 publication of the Administration's strategy for countering weapons of mass destruction, and I commend these documents to you.

What is clear from these documents is that countering terrorism is now front and center in the Administration's approach; that preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, by the so-called "rogue" states or by sub-state actors intent on acquiring these deadly assets, is fully integrated into our overall foreign policy and national security infrastructure; and that the Administration

clearly recognizes that proliferation threats need to be addressed in all their dimensions:

- Through *counterproliferation to combat WMD use*, including a commitment to be prepared to deter and defend against the full range of possible WMD employment scenarios;

- Through *strengthened nonproliferation measures to combat WMD proliferation*, including any number of familiar tools such as diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements, threat reduction assistance, and export controls, that help to impede terrorists or rogue states in their quest for weapons of mass destruction; and

- Through *consequence management to respond to WMD use*, so the affects of such use, be it here at home or abroad, can be minimized.

And we will rely on improved intelligence capabilities, robust research and development, strengthened international cooperation, and other such measures to make sure that each of these pillars is integrated, and at our disposal as conditions merit.

As the Administration carries out these critical pillars of national security, it will benefit from the good work you will do over the next few days. Indeed, it's possible that the title of this Conference, "International Security Challenges and Strategies in the New Era," may not capture the scope of what needs to be addressed. "New century" may be more appropriate, because we are seeing trends take place in the international security environment that could *fundamentally* define the security challenges we will be dealing with for a long time to come.

You may help to illuminate our understanding of the challenges posed by terrorist organizations, which will help the United States – and the international community -- respond to this insidious threat.

You can give policy makers insight into the changing nature of strategic relationships – and thereby give us input into crafting effective diplomatic strategies appropriate for the current era.

And finally, you will look at fundamental questions of deterrence, defense, and security, and the continuing role of nuclear weapons over the next century – questions at the heart of our security posture, and at the heart of our ability to ensure the security of the American people.

Let me give you some ideas to consider as you proceed with your deliberations. First, I think it's critical to appreciate that countering proliferation *can no longer be considered separate and distinct from our broader national security policy*. I know from personal experience that during the Cold War years, as foreign policy was formulated, proliferation concerns were but one consideration – and often a pesky one at that. They were often compartmented and seen as the domain of specialists.

We can no longer get away with that. There are too many countries trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, or their components; too many countries pursuing a capability of their own, for the United States to do anything less than give these issues the attention they deserve. These issues are central to how we define security in the 21st century.

It has also become clear that, given the breadth of the problem and the fact that sub-national groups with similar interests in WMD can be anywhere, *cooperation in suppressing terrorism and countering proliferation should be central elements to how we organize internationally*.

We may be in an era characterized by “cooperative disarmament,” at least until we come up with a better name for it. So the United States relies on a number of cooperative mechanisms to stem proliferation risks.

-- We cooperate *multilaterally*, for example through *formal mechanisms* such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. If we see the obvious value in safeguarding and securing nuclear material to keep it from the hands of the bad guys, then it makes sense that the United States will remain committed to an organization that spends millions of dollars and expends untold resources every year doing precisely that.

-- We’re also working with the IAEA on a *trilateral* basis, with Russia and potentially others, to better secure high-risk radioactive sources in the former Soviet Union. We hope to expand this cooperation with the IAEA to include other states – in fact, Secretary of Energy Abraham recently announced a major initiative to help make that happen.

We cooperate *bilaterally*, for example in our work with Russia, or elsewhere, to better secure nuclear materials at sensitive locations. NNSA’s efforts in Russia are its best-known work and they are critical to advancing international nonproliferation objectives. But we do much more, with many other partners. For example, NNSA is working with Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and other former Soviet states on similar efforts.

And we work closely with others to stem the flow of illicit weapons and materials across borders -- the so-called second line of defense that complements our programs to better secure nuclear materials. For example, the United States works with states in the Middle East and elsewhere to enhance understanding and implementation of export control regulations, and we’re

working with others to improve security and detection capabilities at major transit sites – including our so-called “megaports” initiative.

And we cooperate *on an as-needed basis*, for example through our “coalition of the willing” in Iraq. It is not hard to envisage future scenarios where coalitions are formed based on regional or strategic interests of specific parties. As our national security strategy acknowledges, there are times when nonproliferation policies will fail, and steps are needed to counter proliferation through other than diplomatic means.

Nations need to work together how and where they can, their contributions calibrated to some of the considerations we’ve been discussing today. But all nations have a mutual interest in addressing today’s threats; so we need to work together.

One more thought: I noted that you will be looking closely at fundamental questions of nuclear deterrence, defense, and security, as well as the implications of the Moscow Treaty for security. Given my background, these are issues of fundamental importance to me personally and I look forward to learning the results of your deliberations.

As you know, the Administration has re-conceptualized the strategic triad so that, commensurate with our commitments under the Moscow Treaty, we will be able to maintain a deterrent that is effective, and responsive to today’s security environment. During the Cold War, conceptualizing the Triad as ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers made perfect sense; in today’s era, the Triad needed to be broadened and re-oriented, in order to pose a credible deterrent.

The Administration has done that – we now plan in terms of offensive strike forces, which includes not only our strategic offensive deterrent but

precision strike forces; defenses, both active and passive; and the revitalization of the nuclear weapons infrastructure – including, of course, NNSA assets.

This approach permits the United States to maintain a credible and responsive deterrent, as we reduce our operationally deployed strategic offensive forces to between 1700 and 2200.

So as you consider the Moscow Treaty and its implications, not only for transparency but for any number of critically important strategic issues, I want to challenge you not to fall into "old think," but to think of the importance of the Treaty in the broader context that I have just put before you.

As you begin your deliberations and discussions, I hope that you'll find some of these thoughts helpful. The more we can do to define the threat environment and to clarify what can be done to combat it, the better.

Your conference can help promote those objectives. All of the issues on your agenda will play significant roles in helping to shape a livable and more secure 21st century.

I wish you luck in your discussions, and I appreciate the opportunity to be with you as you begin your deliberations.